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OUTRAGE IS NOT ENOUGH
Review of Brodeur: Outrageous Misconduct: The
Asbestos Industry on Trial
H.J. Glasbeek*
The fact that asbestos manufacturers have had to pay large
amounts of money to some of their victims has made analysts
such as Brodeur happy. They believe that the litigation system
which led to these awards is a useful device because it compensates
victims, punishes wrongdoers and, therefore, is capable of preventing harm. The lawyers who made it function are seen as
glamorous actors. This is wrong on all counts. The torts' system
compensates unevenly and poorly; it does not guarantee that
wrongdoers will be punished" it is ineffective as a preventive device.
Moreover, reliance on the torts' system obscures the reasonsfor
wrongdoing and inhibits the development of better compensation
schemes and more effective regulatory mechanisms. Its main
functions are to make private insurersprofitable, lawyers richer
and, all too often, venal

L'indignation ne suffit pas. Compte rendu de
Brodeur: "Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos
Industry on Trial" (Un mefait abominable:
r'industrie de l'amiante au banc des accuses)
Le fait que les producteurs d'amiante ont dfi payer de grosses
sommes at quelques-unes de leurs victimes a renduheureux certains
analystes, dont Brodeur. Ceux-ci croient que le syst~me de litiges
qui a men6 b ces peines financieres constitue un procgd utile
parce qu'il indemnise les victimes, punit les malfaiteurs, et s'est
donc avgri capable d'emp&her le ma4 et que les avocats qui
ont obtenu cespeines sont des hiros. Tout cela estfaux. Le syst~me
des actions en indemnitg indemnise mal et de fafon inggale; il
ne garantit pas la punition des malfaiteurs; et il est inefficace
come moyen de prevention. En plus, en se fiant 6 ce systbme,
on cache les raisons du mifait et on retarde l'laboration de
meilleurs syst~mes d'indemnisationet de mdcanismes r~gulateurs
plus efficaces. Les fonctions principales de ces actions sont
d'enrichirles assureurspriv~s et les avocats et, trop souvent, de
rendre ceux-ci mercenaires.

Paul Brodeur's "Outrageous Misconduct: The Asbestos Industry
on Trial" is an amazing book. It is so because of the wealth of
information it brings and the paucity of light it sheds. It is, despite
its manifest sense of outrage, a very conventional book, indeed,
one might say a very American book. It is more like an extended
segment of 60 Minutes than it is like anything else. The popularity
*
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of that television programme rests on its apparent willingness to
reveal corruption and wrong-doing everywhere. These revelations
are made dramatic by permitting unsuspecting miscreants to continue to declare their innocence when the investigators (to the
immense pleasure of the viewing public which knows the game)
already have the goods on them. The unmasking of the wrong and
the wrong-doer is everything. The causes of the wrongdoing, its
prevalence, its place in the social spectrum, are not really issues
for 60 Minutes. Indeed, the thrust of the programme is that a society
which fosters programmes like 60 Minutes has a system that works:
exploitation and evil are aberrational; compliance, altruism and good
are the norm. The suggestion is that while sometimes the institutions
created to maintain this good social system work a little imperfectly,
such deficiencies can be remedied and 60 Minutes is there to remind
us of the need to do so, to stand on guard. Brodeur's book reflects
the same superficiality in approach.
It may seem harsh to characterize a book which tells the story
of asbestos litigation in such minute detail as superficial. The
superficiality, however, lies in the book's analytical failings, not
in the author's assembly of data. While Brodeur is not purporting
to write a theoretical book, there is, of course, no such thing as
writing without a theory. Data are collected and presented on the
basis of presuppositions. In Brodeur's case his motivation for writing
is clear. He is angry, very angry, that major economic actors, asbestos
miners, manufacturers and processors, knew of the dangers to which
they were exposing the workers and the public at large and not
only failed to warn their potential victims but, to the contrary, went
to great lengths to hide the danger from them. He is even more
outraged by the fact that when these entrepreneurs were confronted
with their wrongdoing they denied it and, then, when their lies were
made palpable, that they took refuge in all sorts of tactics to avoid
having to compensate their innocent victims. It is doubtful that
any reader of the book would find any reason not to share the
author's rage. It is precisely because of this that Paul Brodeur's
unarticulated theoretical assumptions may have great impact; the
parade of horrible "facts" may lead readers not to look for, nor
to question, these assumptions. Yet those assumptions are wrong,
very wrong.
Given his approach, the 60 Minutes' approach, Brodeur's villains
are portrayed as important, plausible sounding persons who protest
their innocence in the face of mounting incriminating evidence.
His heroes are the investigators and detectives who amassed the
incontrovertible evidence of wrong-doing - principally the victims'
lawyers.' As his kind of lawyers can only succeed in their heroics
when they are acting as trial lawyers, it is the trial system which
becomes the central institution of redress, revenge, accountability
Other heroes include research scientists, such as Irving Selikoff of Mt. Sinai
Hospital, New York, whose pioneering work on the effects of asbestos on
workers advanced the cause of the torts' litigators.
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and redemption. These starting positions cause the book to be badly
flawed.
That Brodeur sees lawyers as saviours is evident from his
description of these lawyers. It is their personal attributes and their
personalities (like those of Mike Wallace, Harry Reasoner, Diane
Sawyer and Ed Bradley) which count. Thus, note his description
of Ward Stephenson, the lawyer who first succeeded in using the
theory of products' liability to help workers recover for their
asbestos-related losses:
Married and the father of two small boys he was a particularly
groomed man of medium height with thinning, sandy hair and blue
eyes, and he was2 noticeably self-conscious about a long deep scar
on his left cheek.
Not only is Brodeur interested in the way lawyers look and in their
family backgrounds, he has unstinted admiration for what he deems
to be their adventurous imaginations. Some of this is captured in
his description of a lawyer called Scott Balwin, whom he describes
as "a small dark haired man with a mischievous smile who looks
a bit like Burgess Meredith." He particularly admires Balwin because
he had the cleverness to assume the appearance of being a hayseed
by dressing himself up like a modern day Malvolio, thereby suckering
a sophisticated
city-slicker type business man into making damaging
3
confessions.
Brodeur's love of lawyering pyrotechnics is similarly unbounded.
It is so unabashed that he often fails to notice the lack of success
these forensic skills bring or, for that matter, the inherent difficulties
reliance on them entails. For instance, he is very much taken by
the astuteness displayed by Ward Stephenson when he examined
witnesses on behalf of his client and, according to Brodeur, demolished powerful evidence against his client with a single question.
The praise practically jumps off the page.4 Yet, he does not remark
at all on the fact that Stephenson's opponent, also a lawyer, by
his clever cross-examination of Stephenson's client in that same
case, destroyed that client's case. Stephenson's client did not recover.
The book is full of such unconscious irony. For example, in his
recounting of the history of the development of the asbestos litigation,
Brodeur points out, with some admiration, how diligent lawyers
2 At

pages 8-9. For similar (sometimes fawning) thumbnail sketches and
anecdotes about leading lawyers in the asbestos litigation business, see the
descriptions at pages 80, 97, 106, 127, 158.
p. 86. The business man is described as a "tall, elegant, and immaculately
tailored man of 57". He describes another lawyer, at p. 135, as follows:
"Ambitious, assertive, and self-confident Motley is a lanky, black-haired who
bears a resemblance to the French actor Jean-Paul Belmondo and speaks
with a deep drawl." Mike Wallace, eat your heart out!
4 p. 36. Sometimes Brodeur is so overwhelmed by plaintiffs lawyers' wiliness
that he sees fit to reproduce huge slabs from the transcripts of examination
of witnesses which, to say the least, lengthen the book unnecessarily and,
if the reader is not overwhelmed by the idea of legal cleverness, are quite
tedious; see particularly, ch. 8.
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were in their investigative discovery work, how they came upon
scraps of letters and other files, how they interviewed potential
defendants' executives and cunningly got them to reveal more than
they should have, and so forth. What he does not comment upon
is the haphazard nature of such a process of discovery. Again and
again, by his own account, it transpires that lawyers in different
parts of the country did not know, for quite long times, about
discoveries made in other parts of the country. Thus, when lawyers
did stumble upon pieces of pre-discovered evidence it was a bit
like finding left-over gold in a mine abandoned by earlier successful
diggers. In this context, note also that it is a little hard to accept
the equanimity with which he treats the fact that some of the evidence
uncovered in one set of cases cannot be made available to other
lawyers (and their victimized clientele) because some plaintiffs'
lawyers, when settling their particular cases, agreed with the asbestos
producers that they would not make available any of the damning
evidence they had gathered to5 other lawyers who might be interested
in pursuing asbestos claims.
In the same vein, Brodeur is very much taken by the ability of
some lawyers to dramatize their cases before juries. 6 For instance,
he is full of admiration for a lawyer called Motley who, encountering
the asbestos manufacturers' argument that alleged asbestos-related
diseases may often be the result of lifestyle habits, such as smoking,
invented a form of reasoning which he called the rat terrier dog
argument. He routinely told juries that a study showed that five
men got asbestosis when working in a particular factory and that,
acknowledgedly, this might be attributable to smoking. He then
revealed that the same study found that a rat terrier spent most
of his life in the factory and had also contracted asbestosis. This
enabled him to finish his presentation with the argument: "The
dog didn't smoke - now did he?" 7 As usual, Brodeur does not
note that such tools of persuasion are available to both sides and
that if a plaintiffs well-being has to depend on how impressed
ajury is by the nature of the presentation, this may backfire. Brodeur
gives us an example of that himself, although he does not make
the link. He describes how an asbestos plaintiff lost his case because,
while he had obtained useful evidence from an expert by means
of deposition, "it went down the tubes when the presiding judge
decreed that it be read by his law clerk, who managed to do so8
in a monotone so flat that it's a wonder the jurors didn't fall asleep."
5 See his description of the Tyler plant case (ch. 3). He actually does note
that, when cases were brought in the 1930's and 40's, the defendants made
similar arrangements with the plaintiffs' lawyers. Later on in the book Brodeur
depicts his plaintiffs' lawyers as heroes because they seek to protect the
rights of other future litigants, not noting that in the past the same category
of lawyers had frequently, in their haste to settle, ignored the plight of potential
claimants. This is an endemic problem; see the description of the Dalkon
Shield litigation by Mintz, n. 16.
6 See particularly at pp. 230-33, 240-43.
1 At page 235.
8 At page 137.
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It is something of an irony that for someone who so admires
the adversary system, Brodeur never acknowledges that it takes
two to tango. To Brodeur the plaintiffs' lawyers' zeal is to be
portrayed as meritorious because of the holy grail-type causes they
are pursuing: seeking compensation for hapless, horribly injured
people, wreaking revenge on plug-ugly buccaneers. He does not
seem to notice that this cult of seeking satisfaction by the employment of rugged individualistic-type tactics has the potential
to create both a very unattractive legal culture and a reprehensible
profession. Thus, while his failure to see the double-edged aspects
of the arguments he makes causes him to complain about the
defendants' lawyers cave men-like tactics - such as the unorthodox
use of Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act process, or the making
of exaggerated claims of potential liability in order to bring
themselves within the confines of that scheme, etc., - it is not
difficult to see that these lawyers were using the legitimate tools
of their trade in exactly the same way as their opponents - the
good guys - were doing. They could justify their behaviour on
the same basis: they were using their abilities to further the needs
of their individual clients. They were, therefore, bound to try to
be as artful as they could be. Thus, if Brodeur glows with admiration
(as he does) for people like Ward Stephenson because he pioneered
a new strategy creating a new area of liability, he ought to be
filled with equal awe and respect for the lawyers of Johns-Manville
who were innovative enough to use an otherwise dormant instrument,
the bankruptcy proceedings, to avoid the full wrath of their clients'
torts' creditors. But, he is not. And, while he admires the cunning
of the plaintiffs' lawyers who trap their clients' adversaries into
making damaging admissions, he seems to be somewhat offended
by defence lawyers who advise their clients to tailor their answers
and materials so that they will not be so trapped. Thus, he shows
strong signs of being perturbed because lawyers for Johns-Manville
had advised scientists how to put the 'best' interpretation on their
findings which, if they had been put out as originally drafted by
the scientists, might have given workers a chance to bring successful
actions much earlier than they did.9 In the same way, he notes
the success of an asbestos companies' lawyer who was able to gain
a run of wins by relying on different expert witnesses than he had
before because the previous expert witnesses had not proven to
be as adept as they ought to have been and, therefore, plaintiffs
had succeeded against him.10 He does not seem to understand the
implications of the fact that lawyers (on either side) are not bound
to put forward scientific truth, but rather the truth on offer which
suits them. In the same way, his view of lawyers as champions
and heroes is not diminished by the fact that sometimes they act
9 See pages 113-115 where he describes the advice and editing efforts of
Hobart and Minard of Newark.
10The victories were those of Lively Wilson (pp. 136-37, 224). I use the
expression "succeeded against him" because this is the way Brodeur sees
the cases: a contest between lawyers.
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- by his own lights - like pool-room hustlers. Thus, when lawyers
appearing for the defendants sought to improve their clients'
bargaining position by making public their disdain for the large
fees charged by the plaintiffs' lawyers in the asbestos litigation,
Brodeur characterizes them as hypocritical because of the huge
sums of money they were making in helping Johns-Manville set
up the litigation-avoiding bankruptcy processes. While Brodeur's
indignation is completely justified,' I he might have acknowledged
the fact that the plaintiffs' lawyers fees were rather large too and
that these lawyers were not motivated only by the need to champion
the oppressed. For instance, right at the beginning of the book,
in the midst of his adulation for Ward Stephenson, he incidentally
notes that Stephenson's contingency fee for his first case was 30%,
a rate which, by the time he had developed what turned out to
be a winning formula, had risen to 40%.12 Similarly, in chapter
3, Brodeur describes the first mass asbestos litigation case brought
to successful conclusion by plaintiff lawyers, the Tyler Texas case.
While Brodeur spends much of the chapter describing how clever
the lawyers were 13, he does not remark (except right at the end
of the chapter) upon the vast sums of money made by the plaintiffs'
lawyers. Rather, he notes that Balwin was a clever lawyer and that
this, in effect, is evidenced by the fact that he has made so much
money. Again, in his description of the young lawyer Baron, he
waxes lyrical. He does note that at one point Baron lost some of
the "files" he had because he and the law firm to which he had
belonged parted company. Fortunately for Baron the other asbestos
litigation lawyers gave him a share of the action. 'Fortunately' is
a carefully chosen word: the chapter finishes by noting that the
plaintiff lawyers in the Tyler case were able to settle for $20 million. 14
The writer is clearly impressed by the fact that the plaintiff lawyers
were able to hang on for $20 million after being offered a paltry
$9 million dollars at the beginning of tough negotiations. He does
mention the fact that the lawyers did very well out of it and that
the three principal ones, whose attributes and activities he describes
At p. 317, he records that the corporate law firms were charging Manville
about $1.5 million a month and that in a year and a half, well-known
firms, such as Heller, Ehrman White, and McAuliffe, had charged more
than $6 million; the blue ribbon firm of Davis Polk & Wardwell had charged
$3.5 million, etc.
12 While Stephenson did not make a large amount of money compared to
other lawyers in this business, note that in the Tomplait case the plaintiff
finished up with $37,500, whereas Stephenson, if Brodeur's figures are
accurate, would have received $20,250. It does not seem as if Tomplait
who, after all, suffered the debilitating injury, got much of a premium for
"

13
14

it.
See the earlier discussion of the lawyer Balwin.
I will not take up the argument here that the $20 million did not only
come out of the asbestos manufacturers' and processors' pockets: govern-

ments and unions were asked to contribute. There is virtually no comment
on this issue by Brodeur. Yet, in a serious book, this kind of apparent
complicity by other actors might have deserved some discussion.
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in some detail in the text, made over $1 million each after they
had paid off other lawyers who had referred work to them. A
contingency fee of 30% on $20 million dollars yielded a tidy sum
for the principal lawyers involved, even after they had paid -finders'
fees. It might be noted that these lawyers all made more money
than any of the successful plaintiffs. It is this grossness and crassness
which gave ammunition to the defendants' lawyers when settlement
time came. 15
Let me pause here and explain why I have spent a considerable
amount of time and space on these aspects of the writer's blindness.
My concern is that Brodeur does not see that the logic of a scheme
which presumes that justice for all is advanced by individuals
pursuing their own narrow interests at all costs permits everyone
to behave in that way, regardless of their class position (that is,
the clients') or of their personal motivation (that is, the lawyers').
Inequality in political and economic power is not a central issue
in such a system, no matter how this inequality evolved historically.
Nor is the productive nature (or the lack of it) of a self-maximizing
activity of any interest to the integrity of such a regime. A scheme
of this kind allows individuals to pursue individual interests at all
costs and has the potential, therefore, to degrade the very dignity
of individuals which it claims to promote. Thus, what Brodeur fails
to perceive is that it is natural and justifiable, in the context of
the ideology of individualism which is the soul of the torts' regime,
for lawyers to advance their clients' (and their own) interests by
tactics which, by standards evaluated by any other means, would
be deemed reprehensible. Examples abound; this is not context
particular. It is the logic of the framework which promotes unacceptable behaviour. It is this logic which permitted the lawyers
for A.H. Robins, the manufacturers of the Dalkon Shield, to seek
to blame injured womens' sexual activity for the debilitating effects
the plaintiffs attributed to the intra-uterine device made by the
manufacturer. In making these arguments, lawyers for the manufacturer put questions to the women about their sex lives and personal
habits, including questions about the names of their sex partners,
their hygienic habits, before and after intercourse, their habits during
menstruation, and so forth. In some instances, lawyers for A.H.
Robins insisted that the womens' husbands be present when such
questions were to be asked, including questions about extra-marital
15

A crassness and greediness which has become obvious even to the plaintiffs'
lawyers. Thus it is that Baron has been cited recently as having helped
to set up a charitable fund to which successful plaintiff lawyers will contribute
25% of their earnings in support of research to prevent disabling diseases
arising out of exposure to asbestos; see "Manville Creditors Oppose Settlement", Washington Post, 18 Feb. '86. This gesture simply had to be made.
Further evidence of the real motivation of the people whom Brodeur thinks
of as the champions of the oppressed was furnished by the tragedy at Bhopal.
Elegantly suited American lawyers were flying over, signing-up clients as
quickly as they could. A multi-billion dollar kind of settlement was in the
offing; 30% of a few billions is almost as good an incentive as the desire
to bring American-style justice to foreigners.
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sex by either spouse. Eventually, it was proved that the defendants
never intended that their device should be sold to females who
were not sexually active or only to those who were sexually active
in a restrictive manner.' 6 That is, the intent of the defence tactics
was harassment, pure and simple. Of course, it was "clever".
Similarly, it is the logic of this framework which permits lawyers
for defendants to look at a woman who has been seriously hurt,
such as the grievously injured Diane Teno, and ask that the courts
reduce the damages award because it will always be possible for
this disfigured and disabled person to find a husband and, therefore,
to lessen her dependence on other resources.1 7 Or, again, it is this
kind of logic which makes it appropriate for a fact-finder in a
and see whether they
civil trial to look at a widow or widower
18
are good candidates for re-marriage.
All of the foregoing is mere quibbling. The greater deficiencies
of the book lie in Paul Brodeur's complete misunderstanding of
the ability of torts' law to deal with serious social and economic
problems.
Because Brodeur sees plaintiffs' lawyers in the same way as
Hollywood saw the champions who jousted for the protection and
love of shy and beautiful princesses in King Arthur-type movies
made in the late 40's and 50's, it never occurs to him that the
litigation-adversary system (the torts' system) in which the jousting
takes place may be of dubious value from the perspective of the
furtherance of aims he wants to pursue, viz., compensation for
victims and punishment for harm-inflicting manufacturers, processors and miners. Brodeur's argument is simple-minded. He justifies
his preferences by the nature of the opposition to them. If a scheme
is supported by the Enemy, then there is no need to think any
further: it is a scheme to be rejected. Thus, Brodeur is sure that
because the proposals for a social insurance fund of some kind
in the asbestos litigation setting have been put forward by defendants
(e.g. by Johns-Manville, through its lackeys, which included pliable
politicians such as Gary Hart, Millicent Fenwick, with the complicity
of such notables as Walter Mondale), they are a good indication
that the torts' system is an ideal mechanism. He believes that he
has supporting evidence which justifies this line of reasoning. He
shows that workers' compensation schemes were created at the
behest of employers. 19 Now, as workers' compensation schemes
See Morton Mintz - At Any Cost (1985), Ch. 11.
17 Arnold v. Teno (1978), 3 C.C.L.T. 272 (S.C.C.).
18 For recent examples of the bizarre nature but, nonetheless, acceptability
of such an exercise, see Kwong v. The Queen (1979], 2 W.W.R. 1, Julian
v. Northern Gas and CentralGas (1980), 11 C.C.L.T.1, Lamont v. Pederson
(1981), 15 C.C.L.T. 216.
19 For this he relies on some American legal history, such as that of Berman,
16

Death on the Job; Occupational Health and Safety Struggles in the United
States (New York: Monthly Rev. Press, 1978). The situation is much more
complex. Thus, in Ontario some say it is fair to believe that the workers'
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in the United States have not adequately looked after workers, nor
have they proved useful devices for harm prevention, it follows
for Brodeur that the torts' litigation scheme - which he sees as
the only alternative - constitutes a satisfactory response to the
inevitable failure of Enemy-sponsored regimes of this kind. The
banal nature of this approach is breathtaking.
To take an example from my own field of work, note that when
unions feel too weak to rely on their collective bargaining power,
they favour compulsory arbitration as an interest dispute settlement
mechanism. When these conditions exist, employers oppose arbi20
tration. When the circumstances are reversed, so are the positions.
That is, the specific source of a proposal does not tell us much
about its utility or merit. Thus, while it is true that it is some employers
and capitalists who now see themselves as being hurt by the torts'
system and who, therefore, want it changed, Brodeur conveniently
ignores the fact that it is the employing - capitalist classes which,
for a long time now, have argued that the torts' regime is ideal
because it emphasizes individual endeavour, because it tailors
remedies to the needs of individuals, because it imposes responsibility
on the appropriate risk-creator when the risk materializes, in short,
because, it is a system which mirrors the basic tenets of the free
enterprise system which they glorify. 2' After all it is this kind of
thinking which the theorists of the law and economics school, the
school which supports the pervasiveness of the invisible hand
arguments (and, therefore, corporate market activity everywhere)
compensation scheme was established as a result of support by both employers
and unions; see Risk, "This Nuisance of Litigation: The Origins of Workers'
Compensation in Ontario" in Flaherty, (ed.) 2 Essays in History of Canadian
Law (1983) 418; for a different interpretation, see Piva, "The Workmen's
Compensation Movement in Ontario" (1975), 67 Ont. Hist., 39. Similar
arguments rage in respect of the United Kingdom legislation and of some
European schemes. But, Brodeur is not interested in refinements of this
kind.
20 The history of the development of Australian compulsory arbitration scheme
shows that workers supported compulsion and employers opposed it; see
J.T. Sutcliffe, History of Trade Unionism in Australia,(Melbourne: MacMillan,
1967), W. Pember Reeves, "The Working of Compulsory Arbitration in
Labour Disputes" (1960), National Review 360. For the U.S. a similar story
is told by Charles J. Morris, "The Role of Interest Arbitration in a Collective
Bargaining System" in The Future of Labour Arbitration in America (New
York City, N.Y.: The American Arbitration Association, 1976). In a similar
vein, employers support compulsory arbitration precisely when legally
striking workers begin to have an impact on their business.
21 Brodeur himself reminds us of the fact that it is conventional wisdom that
the torts' system is a reflection of market ideology when he quotes a plaintiff
lawyer as follows (at p. 287): "To us Manville is more than a legal
adversary.... Its corporate actions shake our faith in the free enterprise
system. Too many victims of asbestos disease have died for their survivors
and friends to shed a tear for a company that has shown so little compassion
for the victims of its willful acts. If Manville is successful in this attempt
to misuse the law to evade responsibility for its deliberate, intentional actions,
then our faith in the legal system will also be shaken."
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have been espousing. 22 Brodeur, then, does not realize the obvious:
the very scheme which his Enemy now wants to abolish or, at
least severely curtail, was supported wholeheartedly by that same
Enemy and its many associates until it turned sour for them.
In his simplistic way Brodeur does not see that a torts' system
does not even serve the hapless victims of market and social activity
very well, even when the "fortunate", that is, successful, asbestos
plaintiffs are included in the tally. For instance, it is well known
that less than 56% of all injured people recover anything at all
from the torts' system. 23 The Pearson Commission in England found
that when all accidents which cause harm are included in the
calculus, only 6.5% of people hurt recover anything from the private
litigation system. 24 In sum, looked at as a means to look after injured
people, the results do not seem to warrant the adulation Brodeur
is willing to bestow on the torts' regime. Moreover, the failure to
compensate adequately and effectively holds true even in respect
of the asbestos cases. Whereas Brodeur is overwhelmed by the
effectiveness of the asbestos litigation (after all, did not some people
collect millions of dollars, some lawyers make a bundle and JohnsManville have to use a sneaky bankruptcy process?), it is to be
See generally Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 3rd ed., (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1986), also his "A Theory of Negligence" (1972), 1 Jo. of Leg.
Stud 29; see also Epstein, "A Theory of Strict Liability" (1973), 2 J. of
Leg. Stud 151. For a very good critique of these law and economics' writers,
see Baker, "The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law" (1975-76),
5 Philosophy and Public Affairs 3.
23 See the Ontario Law Reform Commission's, Report on Motor Vehicle Accident
Compensation (Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General, 1973) which,
in turn, gathered together the findings of Linden's, Report of the Osgoode
Hall Study on Compensation for Victims of Automobile Accidents (1965),
a University of Michigan study by Conard et al., Automobile Accident Costs
and Payments (1964), the British Columbia Royal Commission on Automobile Insurance, Report of the Commissioners (1968), an Oxford University
Study by Harris and Hartz, Report of a Pilot Survey of the Financial
Consequences of PersonalInjuries Suffered in Road Accidents in the City of
Oxford During 1965 (1968), and a study done by the United States'
Department of Transportation, Automobile Insurance and Compensation
Study: Economic Consequences of Accident Injuries (1970). The analysis led
the Report to conclude that less than half the victims received any
compensation at all, that only 28.8% of all victims received full compensation
for the pecuniary losses and that most of those who recovered anything
at all from the torts' system suffered minor losses. Amongst those who had
minor losses, 80% received full compensation, whereas amongst those with
serious injuries, 71% received less than a quarter of the losses they actually
suffered. Note that the Law Reform Commission study dealt mainly with
automobile accident victims where recovery is much easier to obtain than
in other accident situations.
24 See the Report of the Royal Commmission on Civil Liability and Compensation
for Personal Injury (1978, The Pearson Report), Cmnd. 7054. For a critical
analysis of this report see R.A. Hasson, "The Pearson Report: Something
for Everyone?" (1979), 6 British Journalof Law and Society 119 and Ogus,
Corfield and Harris, "Pearson: Principled Reform or Political Compromise?"
(1978), 7 Industrial L J. 143.
22
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noted that it was not until 1967 that Borel 5 first was decided in
a plaintiffs favour, thereby laying the ground for future successful
litigation. Now, as asbestos-related disease was uncovered, by
Brodeur's own account, in 192926 it is a little strange that Brodeur
did not ask himself the question as to why it was that there had
been no successful litigation prior to 1967. Such reflection would
have revealed that neither the courts nor lawyers had been innovative
enough to adapt torts' law so that it could become an instrument
to compensate and to deter. Brodeur does point out that several
attempts to sue were made by asbestos victims in the 1930's and
1940's but that they were unsuccessful. 27 It turns out that they were
unsuccessful because it was hard for plaintiffs to prove that the
defendants knowingly had exposed them to a toxic substance, or
which of several potential defendants should be held responsible
for such exposure, or that their debilitation was not due to their
regrettable lifestyle, etc.2 8 Note that these reasons for failure were
the very same ones which made workers' compensation, according
to Brodeur, such a Trojan horse-like scheme from the point of view
of plaintiffs: the problematic of causal arguments, the difficulties
created by the availability of conflicting expert evidence and/or
the alleged misconduct of employees which enabled insurers to delay
29
and, often, to avoid payment in this supposedly no-fault scheme.
Brodeur's analytical unwillingness or inability to face such arguments hides from him the importance of the innovative nature
of the tactics of Stephenson, the lawyer he so admires. It is not
just that he was imaginative; the strategies used by him also should
have alerted Brodeur to the fact that torts' law had to be changed
dramatically in order for asbestos victims to recover. In particular,
for manufacturers to become liable it was necessary to have positive
judicial holdings to the effect that manufacturers would have to
bear legal responsibility if plaintiffs had been exposed to one of
their dangerous products at some time during their working life.
This required a good deal of manipulation by the courts, as defence
lawyers made arguments that it was not clear whether the employee
was employed by their client or exposed to their client's product
when the disease was contracted. Both the development, and
acceptance, of product strict liability-type doctrine and procedural
mechanisms such as the triple trigger defence 30 demonstrate that
v. FibreboardPaper Products Corp., 493 F. 2d 1076 (5th Circ. 1973),
Cert. denied, 419 U.S., 869 (1974).
This is the date Brodeur said the first extensive causal study was done in
England leading to the passage of the first protective legislation in 1931.
Brodeur himself notes that less convincing causal links had been found as
early as 1900, again in 1906 and in 1924; see ch. 1.
At pages 22, et seq.
These were the difficulties faced by Stephenson's first client, Tomplait; see
pp. 24 et seq.
See page 23.
See Chapter 1 for Brodeur's description of the development of product strict
liability doctrines and his understanding of their importance. For the
establishment of the triple trigger defence which stopped insurers from

25 Borel
26

27
28
29
30
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it is only when the torts' rules are altered sufficiently to lighten
the burden of proving "fault" in a particular defendant that it
becomes easier for victims of asbestos producers to be compensated.
Thus it is when the rules begin to approximate those of a social
insurance scheme, one in which fault is less of a requirement or
not a requirement at all, that the torts' system becomes more effective
from a compensatory point of view. The logic, and one which
Brodeur never perceives, is that if it is truly his wish to have innocent
victims compensated effectively 3 it will best be achieved by having
a fund out of which all injured and diseased people are paid
automatically. This would obviate what remains a serious problem
for the proponent of the existing torts' system, namely that only
a relatively small number of victims can ever be compensated, even
under the newly developed and less demanding fault-finding rules.
In this context, note that Brodeur is exultant about the increasing
number of cases which were being brought by asbestos victims
as the stricter product liability doctrines were being accepted by
the courts. He points out that, as late as 1976, the number of cases
being brought per annum was only 159 but that, by 1982, this
had increased exponentially to six thousand a year.32 He is delighted
because he knows that there are lots of people out there "who
need to be compensated". As a result he casts aspersions and doubts
on the Johns-Manville exercise undertaken by this company when
it sought to predict the total number of claims which would be
brought against it over time. Johns-Manville was concerned to show
that there was a very large potential amount of liability which ought
to permit it to use the Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Act processes but,
of course, it did not want to show that there were so many claims
outstanding that, in fact, reorganization of its affairs would be
pointless and that it should therefore be declared insolvent. Brodeur
suggests that Johns-Manville was deliberately underestimating the
number of potential claimants. 33 Brodeur obviously wants all asbestos victims compensated. But this is impossible. The system came
to a grinding halt when it became apparent that several hundred
thousand people might recover. Brodeur himself notes that
21,000,000 people have been exposed to asbestos. 34 If JohnsManville, after all the reorganization is over, will only take "care"
of two to three hundred thousand people, lesser companies could
take care of many less. The point is that, no matter how vigorously
the torts' litigation is to be pursued, huge numbers of people will
never be compensated. 35 Something of the incoherence of Brodeur's

31
32

33
34
35

avoiding responsibility to asbestos companies, enabling these companies to
meet their obligations as imposed by the new strict liability rules, see Ch. 7.
But not his aim to have a particular defendant punished and/or deterred.
See Chapter 7.
See pp. 265 et seq.
See page 265.
The fact that the torts' system is, as a matter of logistics, utterly incapable
of dealing with mass liability situations is now so well established that it
is risible that Brodeur does not refer to this problem. This logistics' problem
is so great that, eventually, the asbestos claims will be settled by some
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unstinting support for the torts' system can now be more readily
pinpointed.
He is absolutely scathing, as any faithful viewer of 60 Minutes
would be, about the fact that American politicians lend themselves
to help the Enemy make the case for the creation of a fund out
of which asbestos victims are to be paid. This would deny victims
the right to seek out a champion, (oops, a lawyer!), who would
make sure that all victims would have their day (some day) in
court. In particular, he argues that Senator Gary Hart's proposal
was a sell-out of an American birthright by a craven politician:
Hart's measure ... would have eliminated the right of these workers
to be compensated for the pain and suffering they had endured as
a result of asbestos disease, and would have protected the manufacturers from being judged guilty of outrageous and reckless
36
misconduct, which would justify the awarding of punitive damages.
Brodeur seems oblivious to the more promising aspect of the Hart
proposal although, in describing it, he mentions it. Thus, after noting
what Hart was denying, he points out that Hart meant to give eleven
million workers and their families compensation for asbestos-related
disability and losses. He castigates the miserliness of the awards
to be made. Yet, the Hart proposal was to the effect that the minimum
amount of compensation would be tied to the number of dependents
a worker had and that it could not be less than two-thirds or more
than 80% of a sick or dead workers' average weekly wage. This
amount was to be paid throughout the duration of the worker's
37
disability or until the remarriage of his widow or her widower.
For Brodeur, then, to dismiss such a proposal, there must be
two things which really count: the size of the award for injured
victims and the public labelling of the defendants as miscreants.
As to the former, he sadly lacks any kind of utilitarian judgment.
It is not difficult to make a case to the effect that everyone 38 getting
a reasonable proportion of their normal income is better than a
small number of people getting a huge amount of money and a
mechanism such as the Asbestos Claims Facility, a form of pooled-fund
compensation scheme. Similarly, in the Agent Orange cases the number
of potential victims was between 600,000 and 2.4 million. A settlement

36

37

was approved, "forcing" Dow Chemical to pay $180 million to those who
actually manifest related symptoms. The first payments will be made 23
years after the event. Again, 2,000,000 women used the Dalkon Shield;
so far 13,000 suits have been filed against A.H. Robins, only 59 tried. A.H.
Robins has invoked the bankruptcy processes; see Alvin B. Rubin, "Mass
Torts and Litigation Disasters" (1986), 20 Ga L Rev. 429.
At p. 259.

Ibid. Brodeur is clearly oblivious to the fact that there are more efficient
ways to shame and punish outrageous conduct than the torts' system. His

vision is limited by his love of the torts' system to which he can see no
alternatives.
38 Of course, the eleven million that Hart suggested still fall short of the twentyone million that Brodeur says might have to be compensated. Presumably
Hart's proposal could be implemented so as to cover all asbestos-affected
people.
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larger number of people getting nothing. Certainly, this argument
ought to be of some interest to a person who professes to be truly
intent on effectively compensating victims. Further, if Brodeur had
not been so enamoured of the forensic lottery known as the torts'
game, he might have noted that there is nothing in the logic of
the creation of any kind of social fund which requires the compensation to be as low as Hart proposed it to be. That is, once
he realises that the benefit levels depend on political decisionmaking, he might have used that very fervour for what he believes
to be the American ideal of law to support the possibility of a
scheme which depends on the operationalizing of the American
ideal of political participation.
Brodeur manifestly, then, has a belief that there is such a thing
as an appropriate award. Yet, he never comments on the fact that
damages' awards vary enormously from case to case. If the amounts
are large, apparently, they are good awards. It never occurs to him
that the personal circumstances of victims and their families vary
and that these variations may not be reflected in awards made
by courts at different times in different parts of the country. Brodeur
himself noted that Tomplait 39 only got $37,500, whereas people
who brought successful actions much later finished up with million
dollar awards. He never comments on the fortuity and unfairness
of this kind of system. At the same time, he is very proud of the
fact that, in 1979, the average settlement obtained by the plaintiffs
was $21,000 whereas, by 1982 it had risen to $42,000, and that
over those years the average amount awarded to 20,000 plaintiffs
had been $30,000. Again, these amounts are well below the million
dollar awards of which he makes so much in the latter part of
the book, and again they bespeak of different dispositions at different
times in different places, emphasizing the haphazardness of the
torts' system as a compensatory system. This does not seem to
trouble Brodeur. In a similar vein he does not take note of the
fact that the damages' awards include amounts for pain and suffering
and loss of amenities of life, that is, non-pecuniary heads of damages
which are notoriously difficult to quantify. Brodeur himself argues,
at various points, that the amount of damages will vary with the
presentation of evidence, the availability of "good" expert evidence
and the particular make-up of the jury. The result is that in some
circumstances which elicit sympathy the amounts awarded for nonpecuniary losses will be very high and which, of course, would
be hard to justify in a system which has compensation of actual
losses as its focus. 40 The upshot of all this is that the same deviation
from the accepted standard of behaviour, that is the same amount
39 Supra n. 12.
40 This is a principal reason for the Canadian Supreme Court's holding that

a conventional limit be put on the heads of damages; the other reason is
to protect insurers and, thus, insurance policy holders; see Arnold v. Teno
(1978), 3 C.C.L.T. 272; Thornton v. Board of School Trustees of School
District No. 57 (Prince George) (1978), 3 C.C.L.T. 257; Andrews v. Grand
& Toy Alberta Ltd (1978), 3 C.C.L.T. 225.
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of fault, will be treated very disparately because of all these builtin difficulties. Brodeur never bothers to tell us why the system which
he lauds so much should put up with so much incoherence.
Presumably Brodeur's apparent indifference to these issues stems
from the fact that he believes that, as long as heavy damages are
awarded, manufacturers, processors and miners are being punished
just as they ought to be. If such deserved punishment results in
a windfall being paid to some injured persons, Brodeur probably
would say: "so be it". The fact that the punitive effect will vary
greatly from case to case does not concern Brodeur: ethical
retribution and deterrence will be served. He seemingly does not
care that asbestos defendants may be punished many times for having
committed the same wrong. Again, this is justified by an assumption:
no punishment is enough for these wrongdoers. I have much
sympathy for this approach, but it is not a principle consonant with
our legal paradigm. Brodeur, a lover of the legal system, does not
pay attention to the niceties of that very regime. In any event, Brodeur
is wrongheaded in his belief that the right people are being punished
when large damages are awarded to the injured litigants.
When the defendants are large corporations of the Johns-Manville
kind, attacks on their treasuries rarely translate into punishment
of the individuals who were the guiding minds behind the wrongdoing. Moreover, the effect of the damages' award will seldom
be felt directly by the defendant corporations, as they will be insured
against precisely such contingencies. It is crucial to remember that
Johns-Manville was dealing with the asbestos litigation with a great
deal of equanimity until its insurers started to refuse to meet the
mounting litigation costs. The insurance companies were forced
to act in this way because of their careless practices of insurance
and, of course, by their inability to calculate the avalanche of punitive
awards: they were the consequence of unanticipated changes in
the law which prevailed at the time the risks were assessed. Note
here that Brodeur never refers to the fact that his beloved torts'
system could not operate without being shorn-up by some form
of insurance scheme, whether it be privately or publicly funded.
If he had seen that much, he might have to be more skeptical
of the conventional wisdom which suggests that the commission
of wrongful acts is being brought home to the people who behaved
in a faulty manner. In any event, even in cases of the asbestos
kind in which the insurance problems finally led to the defendant
corporations feeling the pain of having to compensate their victims,
it does not follow that the managers who were responsible for the
wrongful behaviour will be dismissed, demoted or even censured.
The difficulties are real: Who made the decisions in respect of which
we want to apply punishment? How are these people to be found?
Similarly, with respect to shareholders: Who were the shareholders
who were in a position to stop wrongful behaviour at the relevant
time? Who were the shareholders who profited from the actual
wrongdoing? These questions, tough as they are, are even made
more difficult by the nature of the asbestos litigation. The long
period which must elapse between exposure to the substances and
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the manifestation of diseases, when combined with the rule - judicially devised - that injury must be established once and for all
by the time the trial takes place, means that managers and shareholders who were actually in responsible positions at the pertinent
time may no longer be around when the plaintiffs' actions are brought
to fruition. As a matter of logic, then, all that the proponents of
the torts' system's utility, such as Brodeur, are left with is the
argument that the very fact that retribution is possible against the
perpetual personality of the corporation acts as an educating force,
as something of an undifferentiated kind of general deterrence. As
recent events show, this is highly unsatisfactory; the proof is in
the pudding.
Now that it is well established that asbestos is a serious danger
to public welfare, the American Environment Protection Agency
has issued a report of a survey of just 10 cities in which it found
that 733,000 public and private buildings contained asbestos in
one form or another. As a result of this there has been pressure
to have asbestos removed from such buildings. Stoffel and Phillips,
two investigative journalists, have reported that this new "megabucks business" has led to a number of unqualified, unlicensed
contractors doing the removal jobs in haphazard, dangerous ways.
This, once again, will expose workers to all the hazards to which
workers in asbestos processing plants were exposed. In addition,
shoddy removal efforts have endangered the inhabitants of the
buildings after the contractors have left. Very little, or no, control
seems to be exercised over the removal processes. 4' One can only
assume that the contractors who are doing these jobs in this carefree
fashion have not been taught a lesson by the supposedly efficient
torts' system which has operated so vigorously against asbestos
producing corporations.
In any event, even if it is assumed that the torts' litigation against
asbestos defendants will lead to some anxiety in manufacturers of
potentially hazardous products, it will be all too easy to avoid the
potential liability which they fear. Schemes are already being
suggested. They include such things as blitzkrieg liquidations
whereby, when serious torts' liability looms, managers will wind
up the company, leaving torts' creditors empty-handed (no doubt,
managers will get the support of the other creditors who will be
paid-off in part in that way); another idea is to set up subsidiaries
or spin-off companies who are to produce the hazardous material,
splitting off this activity from the less liability-creating activities
of the investor. This latter tactic places reliance42on the judiciary's
well-known reluctance to pierce corporate veils.
The point of all of this is that Brodeur, seduced by the glamour
of the trial process and the drama of million dollar damages' awards
and deceived by the fact that a rather unusual situation caused
41 Stoffel & Phillips, "Double Jeopardy; Asbestos is a Hazard that just won't
42

go away", The Progressive,April 1986, p. 28.
See Mark J. Roe, "Corporate Strategic Reaction to Mass Tort" (1986), 72
Va. LR 1.
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insurance companies to go on the run, never recognizes the limitation
of torts' law as a compensatory scheme and/or a deterrent one.
In particular, he does not see any of the points brought out explicitly
and implicitly in this review:
(i) The torts' system attributes fault, for policy reasons, by making
victims prove it. Over 50% of all victims will fail to recover
anything from the system. This is meant to be so, as recovery
for all victims would no longer permit it to be a "fault" system.
(ii) There is no natural relationship between the compensation
which is awarded and the severity of the fault.
(iii) Compensation of those victims who do recover bears no
resemblance to their pecuniary and concrete losses; as to
whether or not it bears a relationship to their intangible losses
one is left to guess.
(iv) Delay is required by the system and this, of course, means
that there is pressure on bleeding victims to accept terms
of settlement which are inadequate.
(v)
All of this entails the fact that there have to be victims before
the system operates at all.
(vi) Judges and juries are asked to make guesses about what ought
to be awarded.
(vii) Lawyers and judges, to do their job properly, are forced to
impose indignities on seriously hurt people.
(viii) People who do not recover anything from the system - and
there will always be some, often many - are forced into
instant poverty, because the only asset most of them have
is a steady income. This has been cut-off sharply. That is,
those people become poor because they were the victims of
accidents.
(ix) Insurance companies have become very wealthy because the
torts' system requires that all risk-takers in society (capitalists,
workers, consumers, house owners, etc.) seek to cover themselves against risk. In the result, the same risk is often covered
by several policies. 43 This is wasteful for all except insurers.
The amounts tied up in such policies, if put into one pool
comprehensive and adequate no-fault
could easily support a 44
compensation scheme.
(x)
Lawyers prosper under the system;45 in the United States they
take 30% to 40% of all damages awarded.
43

44
45

For an insightful description of this phenomenon in a particular area, see
R.A. Hasson, "Subrogation in Insurance Law" (1985), 5 Oxford Jo. LS.
416.
See Terence G. Ison, "Human Disability and Personal Income", in Klar,
(ed.), Studies in Canadian Tort Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1977), 425.
In addition to earlier comments made, note that, as part of a review of
the American Trial Lawyers' Environmental and Toxic Tort Litigation
Section, U.S. Law Week, 13 Aug. 1985, wrote: "Representing plaintiffs who
have been injured by the myriad chemicals in the modem environment
involves an enormous investment of time and money - at great risk of
no recovery. The stakes are high enough, however, to attract the adventurous
[lawyer]."
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(xi)

There is no evidence at all that the system leads to better
behaviour in general.
The last point is the crucial one. Brodeur never confronts the
issue as to why corporations behave as the asbestos ones did and
why this kind of behaviour is in fact endemic. It never seems to
occur to him that balancing money and life is part and parcel of
all enterprise. What is peculiar about the private enterprise system
is that, all too often, the potential victims are not given a role in
defining the extent of the risk. It is this lack of participation or
consent which leads us to treat the conduct of a mugger, an arsonist
or a bank robber as scandalous, as totally unacceptable and,
therefore, criminal behaviour. In cases of that kind we want to
stigmatize and to punish individuals, not to ask them to bear some
of the losses which they inflict and to permit them to pass on some
of these imposed costs if they can.
If the asbestos story had been told so as to point out the fact
that the behaviour of the defendant companies (that is, deliberately
imposing risks on others by withholding information from them)
was not abnormal at all, but one which is characteristic of the
profit-maximizing nature of our society, especially as now, in a
world of corporate giants, it is allied to the abandonment of any
notions of individual responsibility, then it would have been a very
helpful and well-told story. It might have lifted concerned people,
such as Brodeur, up from the plateau of surprised, angered citizens
to a new level of awareness. They would be in a position to begin
to understand:
(i) that the harm which is done to people in the name of profit
can be inflicted safely precisely because the only responsibility
which Brodeur's beloved torts' system imposes is one which
arises after injury has been inflicted, and,
(ii) that when that responsibility is finally imposed, it is unlikely
to result in punishment of actual wrongdoers or even in the
punishment of many of those who have vicariously profited
(and richly so) from the errant behaviour of other wrongdoers.
(iii) It would have become manifest that the imposition of responsibility for wrongdoing via the torts' system is not likely to
affect other profit-maximizers in such a way as to make them
harm-avoiding actors in any other sphere of the economy (or
even in the same one, as we have seen).
If all of this had been clear it would have become possible to
confront the problem of outrageous conduct squarely. Its genesis
would have come into focus; real remedies then could become the
subject of research.4 6Brodeur's book denies us these opportunities.

46

The focus could then be on how to improve regulatory, preventive mechanisms, given the endemic nature of corporate errant behaviour. I have begun
to explore why such schemes are as deficient as they are and how they
might be improved elsewhere; see Glasbeek, "Why Corporate Deviance
is not Treated as a Crime - The Need to Make 'Profits' a Dirty Word"
(1984), 22 O.H.LJ. 393. A lot more work is required.

